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Summary 
The 'market versus hierarchy' dichotomy frequently appears in modern theory 
on industrial organization and the theory of the firm. This dichotomy 
approach can be criticized for its xigidity and for being too abstract for 
implementation in empirical research. To overcome these limitations we 
introducé the concept of transaction regimes. This concept allows for the 
synthesis of prior insights with 'non-fitting' empirical evidence. The paper 
characterizes and compares five archetypical transaction regimes in capitalist 
market economies. In two of these transaction regimes the transaction 
relations are to an important extent governed by cooperative pattems, 
supported by the development of mutual trast. Such voluntary cooperation 
should be considered as a third basic allocation mechanism, apart from 
market and hierarchy. 
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1. Introduction 
In publications on transaction costs and property rights - sometimes grouped 
together as the 'New Institutional Economics' - one frequently encounters the 
use of the 'market' versus 'hierarchy' dichotomy. Critiques of this dichotomy 
approach mainly stressed its rigidity, since it implies that all forms of 
economie organization can be reduced to either market or hierarchy. It has 
been argued that long-term voluntary co-operation patterns, both among and 
within firms, do not fit well in the dichotomy. A second weak spot of the 
dichotomy approach is of a very different nature, and has, surprisingly, 
attracted much less discussion as yet. The level of abstraction of the concepts 
'market' and 'hierarchy' is so high that operationalization becomes a major 
stumbling block. An embarrassing gap remains between market and hierarchy 
as abstract allocation principles on the one hand, and real-life economie 
organization patterns, on the other hand. Therefore, the trap of misplaced 
concreteness is constantly lurking below the surface of the dichotomy 
discussion. As a way out we introducé the concept of transaction regimes to 
allow for a more diverse set of economie organization patterns than merely 
two. 
The paper is organized in five sections. The second section deals with the 
limitations of the 'market versus hierarchy' dichotomy that characterizes much 
of the so-called New Institutional Economics literature. In the third section 
the concept of transaction regimes is defined, and its constituting elements are 
briefly sketched. Due to the diversity of institutional transaction contexts, 
several archetypical transaction regimes can be distinguished. In the fourth 
section the concept is made more tangible by comparing a number of 
transaction regimes that frequently co-exist in capitalist market economies. On 
the basis of this comparison the fifth section re-interprets the discussion on 
the market - hierarchy dichotomy, and discerns the contours of a third 
allocation mechanism: co-operation. A concluding section completes the 
paper. 
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2. Limitations of the 'market versus hierarchy' dichotomy 
The 'market versus hierarchy' dichotomy has become an important issue in 
institutional economics, in the theory of the firm, and in parts of industrial 
organization theory.1 By confronting market and hierarchy as two 
fundamentally opposed allocation mechanisms, a research agenda arose in 
which it was tried to specify the theoretic conditions under which either of 
these mechanisms would be preferred. This led to valuable insights and 
applications of the so-called 'transaction cost economics' (cf. Williamson 
1989). There is, however, growing criticism on the limitations of the 
dichotomy approach. A first objection is of a theoretical nature and concerns 
the exclusivity of the dichotomy. Why should all economie organization 
patteras ultimately be reducible to only two basic allocation mechanisms?2 
Several alternative allocation mechanisms have been mentioned in the 
literature. 
Arrow (1969) distinguishes market allocation and hierarchy, but also mentions 
coUective action by social norms and mutual agreement as other forms of non-
market allocation mechanism. He considers the latter as unstable, costly and 
inflexible. According to Kornai (1989, p.1-20) all economie micro-processes 
are coordinated by only four basic allocation mechanisms, or combinations of 
them. Apart from market and hierarchy he mentions aggressive coordination 
and ethical coordination. The main difference between aggressive coordination 
and hierarchy is that the former is established by willful force, and not 
institutionalised by law or morality. As a consequence it is mostly not lasting. 
Ethical coordination bears a clear resemblance to Arrow's coUective action by 
social norms. It also presupposes a non-hierarchic and voluntary relation 
between transaction partners. According to Kornai, it may be based on 
reciprocity, on the expectation of mutual help, or on one-sided altruism. For 
1
 It dates back to the contributions of Coase (1937), Simon (1950; 1959), and Arrow (1969). 
From another angle - the confrontation of the decentralised decision making process under 
capitalist market conditions versus centralised (hiërarchie) economie decision making under 
socialist planning conditions - an important contribution was presented by Von Hayek (1945). 
More recently, Williamson's publications (1975; 1985) formed important benchmarks in this 
discussion. 
2
 Schreuder (1990) points at some inconsistencies in Williamson's work which can be traced 
back to the latter's uneasiness in applying a strict dichotomy. 
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lasting prevalence of ethical coordination it should be fixed by custom, 
tradition and by morally obligatory norms, including religion. Though one 
could object that ethical coordination is rather a heterogeneous collection of 
allocation mechanisms than a consistent single system of economie 
coordination, it is nevertheless clear that it is of a non-market and non-
bureaucratic type. Several recent contributions to economie literature search 
for the theoretical contours of allocation mechanisms based on co-operation 
and mutual trust. Zukin & DiMaggio, Best and Powell all conclude that 
within the old dichotomy it is not possible to deal satisfactorily with co-
operation among firrns in networks in which repetitive transactions, leading to 
trust relations, take place.3 This point will be elaborated on in Section 5 of 
this paper. For now, it is enough to conclude that the exclusivity of the two 
extremes of the market versus hierarchy dichotomy is increasingly considered 
as too limiting. 
A second limitation of the dichotomy approach concerns its applicability in 
empirical research. Empirical research inspired by the market versus hierarchy 
approach is hampered by an identification problem caused by two related 
factors. Firstly, empirical exchange transactions may be characterized by 
elements of both allocation principles at the same time. Extensive research 
has shown that markets and hierarchies are not mutually exclusive in practice, 
but that they are often intertwined, both within and among firms.4 Secondly, 
everyday economie practice is characterized by complex organizational and 
allocative patterns that only bear a hazy relation to both fundamental 
allocation mechanisms. At the abstract dichotomy level, neither 'market' nor 
'hierarchy' can be equated with actual organizational forrns. Treating them as 
such would lead into the trap of misplaced concreteness. By an historical 
abstraction process both extremes of market versus hierarchy dichotomy 
became narrowly-defined theoretical concepts. This may be illustrated by a 
brief digression on the conceptual history of 'market allocation'. At an 
3
 In their book on the New Institutional Economics, Zukin & DiMaggio suggest that given 
the inability of the concepts of market and hierarchy to capture the (frequent) occurrence of 
ongoing relationships of trust and mutual dependency, there is "...a need for a third ideal-type 
decision structure, based on informal social relations, parallel to markets and firms" (Zukin & 
DiMaggio 1990, p.9). Best (1990) and Powell (1989) argue that the dichotomy cannot capture 
the complexities of competition and institutional dynamics in real life economie exchange. 
Several articles collected in Thompson et al. (1991) come to the same conclusion. 
4See: Bradach & Eccles (1989), Williamson (1985,p.83-84;Ch. 7,8,10,13;1991). 
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empincal level, markets are social institutions with rules and hehavioural 
patterns which may widely differ. In the early days of economie theoiy this 
diversity problem was typically solved by selecting one particular type of 
market organization, mostly the stock market, or the market for precious 
metals. Subsequently this particular market was stylized to a model of what 
would become the reference type of market for further theorizing.5 
Especially after the 'marginalist revolution' of the 1870s, the market is more 
and more seen as an abstract allocation mechanism for determining relative 
prices and allocation of goods, quite distinct from actual markets. Later on, 
even the historical roots of this abstraction process disappeared from 
economie textbooks. The gap between the functioning of actual markets and 
abstract microeconomic theory of market behaviour has become remarkably 
wide.6 The identification problem impedes empincal research on market 
functioning and firm behaviour. 
In the case of hierarchical allocation there is also a wide diversity of actual 
forms of economie organization, ranging from Hayek's national planning by a 
centralist bureaucracy, to the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, and to the 
Chandler's large bureaucratie firm. The equation of hierarchical allocation 
with whichever of these organizational forms would be mistaken. The defining 
characteristics of allocation by hierarchy are much more abstract,7 so that it is 
not a readily available empirical concept. 
The market versus hierarchy dichotomy has had its significance for the 
development of the theory of the firm and the theory of transaction cost 
economics, but has by now become an obstacle for further progress in this 
area. Conceptually, a large gap remains between the abstract principles of 
5
 This procedure is to be found in the writings of, for instance, Walras (1952, p.44-48), 
Jevons (1871, p.84-86) and Marshall (1898, p.403-404). Their selection criteria differ slightly. 
Walras and Jevons, who almost simultaneously proceed in a remarkably similar way, select their 
'model markets' by the criterion market organisation and information availability to market 
partjes. 
6
 A major modern textbook on industrial organisation illustrates this gap. In the 
introduction of his book Tirole states: "The notion of a market is by no means simple", but 
concludes this discussion with: "For the purpose of the present book, this empirical difficulty of 
defining a market will be ignored. It will be assumed that the market is well defined [..]". 
(Tirole 1988, p. 12-13). 
7
 Usually these characteristics center around systematic administration, and progressive 
breaking down of complex tasks into specialized, carefully-ordered functions, which are 
(bureaucratically) coordinated by a fixed set of rules and a stratified authority structure. See: 
Frances et al. (1991,p.9-14). 
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organization (market or hierarchy), and real life economie interaction 
patterns. To fill in this gap we propose an intermediary concept: transaction 
regimes. Although it is still an abstract concept, transaction regimes possess 
the main elements of real forms of economie organization. The concept is 
flexible enough to describe many types of economie organization. It also gives 
full account to the fact that the history of mutual contacts between transaction 
partners has important implications for both price and transaction form. 
3. The concept of transaction regimes 
A transaction regime is defined as a set of common characteristics of exchange 
transactions taking place in a specific institutional context. Transaction regimes 
categorize arrays of individual transactions according to the commonality of 
their institutional context and the way transactions are reached and 
implemented. Although the concept is less abstract than the allocation 
principles of 'market versus hierarchy', a transaction regime is still a 
theoretical concept. It abstracts from detailed, every-day transaction 
procedures and also transcends the level of pure market analysis. 
Exchange transactions have six main phases. First, transaction partners 
encounter each other from their specific historical and social background. 
Second, information with regard to the potential transaction is exchanged. The 
main element in each transaction concerns settling the specific exchange 
proportions. Furthermore, and especially when the transaction involves some 
future entitlements, they implicitly or explicitly agree on a number of 
supporting exchange conditions, primarily aimed at dealing with opportunism. 
Fifth, the deal is completed in a particular juridical or non-juridical 
transaction form. Finally, transaction partners conclude the transaction with 
some (or no) prospects for future transactions. In line with these phases each 
transaction regime can be characterized by six elements: 
(a) the mutual relations (status) of transaction partners. Transaction partners 
meet each other in a social and historical context. This institutional 
embeddedness of the transaction partners determines why they meet, how 
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they meet and what their mutual status is. This element includes the juridical 
relation between partners, the authority relations, and the degree of mutual 
familiarity. 
(b) the form and content of pre-transaction information transfer. Before an 
exchange transaction can be concluded, potential partners exchange 
information on their supply possibilities and their demand preferences with 
regard to the transaction object. Important aspects of fhis element are the 
form of inter-partner information transfer and the way in which the 
specifications of the transaction object are determined. 
(c) agreement and expression of the exchange proportions. The prime part of 
the transaction concerns the establishment of the reciprocity relations: what is 
given for what (barter, money, future entitlements), in what quantities 
(exchange proportions, relative price), and by which decision criteria. Under 
capitalist conditions the exchange proportions are expressed either by an 
arms' length market price or by an (intra-company) transfer price. 
(d) dealing with opportunism. Apart from the direct exchange proportions a 
number of supporting conditions are implicitly or explicitly agreed upon. The 
supporting conditions aim to prevent or penalize opportunistic behaviour after 
the transaction agreement. Opportunistic behaviour may have different causes, 
can have different forms, so that also the arrangements to limit opportunistic 
behaviour will differ between transaction regimes. 
(e) characteristics of the transaction form. The transaction is concluded in a 
particular form (written, unwritten) which may or may not have a juridical 
status vis-a-vis the external world. If a transaction form is chosen that refers to 
a commonly-accepted set of private rules or laws, this means that some 
supporting transaction conditions (cf. point d) automatically become operative, 
so that no specific agreement is required on these points. 
(f) potential future of the transaction. Finally, and that relates again to the 
first element, the transaction is influenced by the prospects of repetition. In 
turn, this will certainly influence the arrangements of elements d) and e). 
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The number of transactions regimes is a function of the number of variations 
in institutional preconditions under which exchange relations take place. 
Leaving minor differences in institutional preconditions unconsidered, the 
diversity of transaction regimes can be reduced to a limited number of 
archetypical species. A first broad classification would be to distinguish 
centrally planned economies, feudal economies, capitalist market economies, 
non-monetized exchange and entitlement systems. Within each of these 
clusters of transaction regimes a spectrum of varieties exists which can also be 
ordered in a number of groups which share some common traits.8 
4. Five main transaction regimes of capitalist economies 
In this paper we will focus on capitalist economies. Capitalist market 
economies are characterized by the existence of production for market 
exchange, private ownership of means of production, the existence of a market 
for labour power, and predominance of hiërarchie labour relations. Our focus 
will be on transactions in goods and non-factor services. Labour market 
transactions, due to their peculiar nature9 will be left unconsidered here. 
The capitalist market economy, in which transactions share the afore 
mentioned traits, is a cluster of regimes rather than a single transaction 
regime. We will compare five archetypical, non-mixed transaction regimes 
8
 Several regimes show mixed transaction characteristics like that of co-operative production 
units, and that of unincorporated companies, often characterizing small enterprises. The 
'unincorporated sector' transaction regime often prevails in small-scale enterprises in 
agriculture, retail sales and services. It is characterized by a strongly interwoven pattem of 
transactions which exists between the 'corporate part' and the 'household part' in the sphere of 
allocation of labour, savings, and accumulation. These transactions and entitlement exchanges 
are only partly monetized or formalized in enforceable juridical forms. The pre-transaction 
information flow is very direct. Intemal ownership transfer is not involved generally, but the 
matter can be complicated by inheritance and marriage conventions. 
9
 Capitalist labour relations are characterized by the fact that all agents own their own 
labour power, and that it is possible for some agents to hire and fire the labour power of other 
agents. The typical capitalist firm is characterized by the fact that the firm does not have any 
property rights over the worker and the human capital embodied in him, and the worker in turn 
does not have any property rights in the firm and/or bis job, while he has only ill-defined 
property rights with regard to the human capital built up during the performance of nis job. 
From these characterics follow a number of peculiarities with regard to the labour power 
transaction. See: Pagano (1991); Marglin (1974). 
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which frequently co-exist in the private sector of capitalist market economies. 
The first three of them regard inter-company relations, the last two concern 
intra-company relations: 
* the (metion regime, characterized by spot transactions, market clearing, 
price taking and anonymity of transaction partners. 
* the dependent subcontracting regime, an insecure, asymmetrical but possibly 
long-term relationship. 
* the industrial district regime, geographical concentrations of (often small) 
firrns with recurrent co-operative and consultative links. 
* the clan regime or intra-company co-operation regime, characterized by 
frequent mutual consultations and goal congruence within the firm. 
* the direct control regime, characterized by hierarchical decision structures. 
Table 1 gives a matrix presentation in which the five non-mixed regimes are 
compared by giving their 'scores' on the six main elements of exchange 
transactions. The scores in the table are 'binarized', i.e. in each cells of the 
matrix, a yes' is coded as (2) and a no as (0). Based on the table, the five 
transaction regimes will each be briefly discussed below. 
The Auction transaction regime 
The auction is a particular form of market organization. We will use the 
auction transaction regime as an allegory for a broad category of market 
transactions with some common traits. Although several auction types exist, 
with varying rules (e.g. Smith 1989), auctions have some elements in common. 
The exchange object is a given or standardized object on which information is 
widely available. Transaction partners are to a large extent anonymous to 
each other. They meet in principle once-only, without history and future 
transaction prospects, to buy or sell a given object. Their preferences 
(willingness-to-sell, willingness-to-pay) are implicitly shown in their price 
bidding behaviour. Price bidding is the main element of their bargaining. 
Since the transaction partners are unrelated, they are maximally inclined to 
shift from one transaction partner to another when this would offer them a 
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Table 1. Comparative charactenstics of five main capitalist transaction regimes 
TBAHSACTIOH REGIMES 
HUfflSaCIICH ELEMEHÏS 
A. MUTUAL RELATIONS TRANSACTION PARTNERS 
Al. Juridical status of partners: 
All. related by common ownership 
A12. formal freedom to trade with thlrd parties 
A2. Authorlty ralation between partners: 
A21. non-hierarchical 
A22. hierarchlcal due to informal power asymmetry 
A23. hierarchlcal due to formal ownership 
A3. Partner familiarity: 
A31. no familiarity 
A32. prior knowledge of partner 
A33. familiarity and mutual trust 
B. FRE-TRANSACTION INFORMATION TRANSFER 
BI. Supply Information targeted to broad audience 
B2. Demand Information transferred by: 
B21. pxice offer (willingness-to-pay) 
B22. asking around, tendering 
B23. unilatexal command/order 
B3. Product specification determined by: 
B31. producer only (Standard product) 
B32. buyer only 
B33. mutual consultation between partners 
B34. hiërarchie decision 
C. SETTLING EXCHANGE PROPORTIONS 
Cl. Exchange proportions expressed as: 
Cll. Arm's length price 
C12. Transfer price 
C2. Exchange proportions determined by: 
C21. Market conditions 
C22. Power relations between partners 
C23. Long-term mutual interest 
C24. Internal consensus 
D. DEALING WITH OPPORTÜNISM 
Dl. Opportunism threat arising from: 
Dll. Anonymity 
D12. Asset specificity 
D13. Goal incongruence 
D14. Lacking ex ante performance standards 
D2. Dominant forms of potential opportunism: 
D21. Distorted / incomplete ex ante Information 
D22. Hold-up 
D23. Moral hazard 
D3. Opportunism checked by: 
D31. Detailed contract 
D32. Asymmetrie hold-up threat 
D33. Symmetrie hold-up threat 
D34. Thorough mutual familiarity (repeated game) 
D35. Authority (detailed order) 
E. TRANSACTION FORM 
El. Transaction has juridical contract status 
F. TRANSACTION FUTURE 
Fl. Repetition prospects of transaction: 
Fll. Not envisaged 
F12. A priori uncertain 
F13. Mutually envisaged 
F14. Infinite (open-ended) 
IHTEK-CQHPAHY IBTRA-COMPAIY 
ADC- SUB- TKD. DIRECT 
TIOH COHTR. DISTR. CLAM CORTSOL 
0 0 0 1 1 All 
1 1 1 0 0 A12 
1 0 1 0 0 A21 
0 1 0 0 0 A22 
0 0 0 1 1 A23 
1 0 0 0 0 A31 
0 1 1 1 1 A32 
0 0 1 1 0 A33 
1 0 1 0 0 BI 
1 1 0 0 0 B21 
0 0 1 1 0 B22 
0 1 0 0 1 B23 
1 0 0 0 0 B31 
0 1 0 0 0 B32 
0 0 1 1 0 B33 
0 0 0 1 1 B34 
1 1 1 0 0 Cll 
0 0 0 1 1 C12 
1 1 1 0 0 C21 
0 1 0 0 1 C22 
0 0 1 1 0 C23 
0 0 0 1 0 C24 
1 0 0 0 0 Dll 
0 1 1 0 0 D12 
0 1 0 0 1 D13 
0 0 1 1 0 D14 
1 0 0 0 0 D21 
0 1 1 0 0 D22 
0 1 1 1 1 D23 
1 0 0 0 0 D31 
0 1 0 0 0 D32 
0 0 1 0 0 D33 
0 0 1 1 0 D34 
0 0 0 0 1 D35 
1 1 1 0 0 El 
1 0 0 0 0 Fll 
0 1 0 0 0 F12 
0 0 1 0 0 F13 
0 0 0 1 1 F14 
better bargain. This maximum of ex ante opportumsm implies that any 
auction transaction which would involve future commitments or entitlements, 
will be specified in detailed contracts in order to preclude opportunist escapes 
as much as possible. Due to the fact that the degree of ex ante opportumsm is 
so high, and that transaction costs of making detailed contracts are generally 
very high, most auction transactions are 'on the spot' deals. 
The Dependent Sübcontracting transaction regime 
The dependent sübcontracting regime deals with transactions between 
formally independent firms, each representing a separate ownership entity. 
Especially the subcontractor is often 'tied' into the relation, and lacks the full 
freedom to transact with other parties. On the other hand, the outsourcing 
companycan easily switch between suppliers. The most distinctive 
characteristic is a difference in bargaining power between transaction parties, 
resulting in an authority relation without a formal hierarchy. The outsourcing 
company is the leading transaction partner. Goal incongruence is high, but 
factual behaviour is as if goal incongruence is low due to the difference in 
bargaining power. To achieve a long term relationship with his customer the 
subcontractor has to invest by performing more than minimally agreed. His 
investment is not necessarily reciprocated, and the relationship can easily be 
broken by the buyer. A dependent sübcontracting regime has no automatic 
renewal of contracts. Performance ambiguity and monitoring costs are usually 
rather low. The subcontractor has limited options to opportunistic behaviour, 
and runs a high risk of expulsion when his opportunistic behaviour is 
discovered. 
Pre-transaction information by the buyer is transferred to a large number of 
potential subcontractors with equal technical qualifications. Subcontractors 
transfer information to a limited number of potential customers. Information 
on demand is obtained through unequal bargaining on orders. Product 
specifications are set by the buyer, without consultation. First an agreement is 
struck, than production takes place. Exchange proportions are settled 
10
 As Jevons phrases it: "Every individual must be considered as exchanging from a pure 
regard to his own requirements or private interests, and there must be perfectly free 
competition, so that any one will exchange with anyone else for the slightest apparent 
advantage" (Jevons 1871, p.86). 
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according to a combination of supply and demand conditions and patron-
client relationships. Power differences between partners influence the 
outcome in the sense that the powerful pushes the powerless, as far as norms 
and values of reciprocity allow. 
Subcontractors face a large opportunistic threat from buyers, a threat to which 
they have no real answer. The main opportunistic threat comes from asset 
specificity, resulting in a potential hold-up by buyers. This holds particularly 
for subcontractors who have invested in job-specific raw materials or 
equipment. 
The Industrial District transaction regime11 
The industrial district transaction regime deals with transactions between 
independent firms that exchange ownership of products or services. Although 
these firms juridically have full freedom to search for transaction partners, the 
actual search for transaction partners is often restricted to the own 
geographical district. This is due to a thorough knowledge among the 
members of the district of each others reputation, resulting in (dis-)trust 
relations between specific parties. Goal incongruence is lower than in the 
auction regime because the actors realize that they are not only competitors, 
but that they also need to co-operate to be able to withstand competition 
from elsewhere. Pre-transaction information is targeted mainly within the 
district, and information on demand reaches firms through consultation by 
buyers, or through directly placed orders. Product specifications are 
determined through consultation between buyer and producer and production 
takes place after the agreement has been struck. 
The exchange proportions are settled on the basis of a combination of supply 
and demand conditions ('the market') and the realization of a long term 
mutual interest ('co-operation'). The transaction is completed on real arms' 
length prices, and includes ownership exchange. Both parties involved in the 
transaction envisage the option of a long term relationship. A high 
performance ambiguity and rather high monitoring costs imply an 
11
 Industrial districs were first described by Marshall (1919), writing about regional 
industrial clusters in England. More recently this line of analysis has been taken up by Italian 
researchers seeking for analytic tools to describe the succesful forms of local industrialization 
and industrial cooperation in some Italian regions. See: Becattini (1990); Brusco (1982); Pyke, 
Becattini & Sengenberger (1990); Best (1990, p.203-250). 
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opportunistic threat. This may stem from a threat of hold-up, i.e. unilaterally 
ending a transaction. A hold-up is especially damaging in case one transaction 
partnei had to invest in specifïc assets. Opportunism may also result from 
moral hazard, i.e. sustaining information asymmetnes by a strategie use of 
information (obfuscating, cheating, misleading). This hold-up threat is held in 
check by the fact that it is a symmetrical mutual hold-up. The moral hazard 
threat is checked by a process of socialization in the district, e.g. thorough 
knowledge of each others' situation, shared public goods (like apprenticeships, 
education). Also, local reputations regarding company capabilities and 
trustworthiness may play an important role in preventing opportunist 
behaviour. 
The Clan transaction regime 
The intra-company co-operation regime or - using the terminology of Ouchi 
(1980) - clan transaction regime refers to intra-company transactions between 
departments or plants of a single company.12 The existence of a single 
ownership entity inherently creates an authority relation, but the latter 
operates in the background. Management instigates frequent use of intra-
company consultative procedures, oriented at common problem solving. The 
goals of the leading partner, i.e. central management, become internalized, 
thereby decreasing goal incongruence. Frequent consultations and 
socialization result in a high degree of mutual farniliarity and the development 
of mutual trust. Individual transactions form part of an open-ended, long-term 
relationship. 
Information is spread within the firm only, on the basis of a combination of 
command and consultation. Product specifications are determined by consulta-
tion, but the ultimate decision is taken by the leading partner. The exchange 
proportions in intra-company transactions are based on long term mutual 
interest plus seeking internal consensus. Transfer prices are used, with no 
exchange of product ownership. There is an open ended number of 
transactions, with a mutually envisaged repetition. Performance ambiguity is 
usually very high, and thus the main opportunistic threat is one of moral 
hazard. This is checked by socialization (consultation procedures, partner 
12
 Ouchi (1980) originally focussed on transactions between individuals, but we extend bis 
analysis to transactions between departments of the same company. 
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familiarity, interaal reputation) and the underlying authority relation, e.g. 
expressed by fmancial performance premiums. 
The Direct Control transaction regime 
The direct control transaction regime governs intra-company transactions in 
many large firms with a unified ownership. The ownership relation is 
translated into a hierarchical decision structure. The main decisions are taken 
at the highest ownership level, while lower-level organizational layers are 
granted the right to transact with each other according to well-defined 
routines and procedures.13 Transaction partners do not have full freedom to 
trade with third parties. In a vertically-integrated company structure they are 
typically condemned to each other. Bureaucratie routines rule pre-transaction 
information transfers. Horizontal transaction activities between departments 
and plants are configured by vertical authority structures. Exchange 
proportions are expressed in intra-company transfer prices, which may or may 
not reflect arms' length market prices. Opportunist behaviour will mainly 
result from goal incongruence between transaction partners, since each may 
follow his own department- or plant-specific goals. Moral hazard will be the 
dominant form of opportunist behaviour. Threats of opportunist behaviour are 
suppressed by bureaucratie orders and evaluation procedures. Transaction 
partners face the prospect of an infinite (open-ended) sequence of future 
transactions. 
Thefive transaction regimes asforms of economie organization 
The regime that comes closest to the 'pure' market allocation, according to 
the market versus hierarchy dichotomy, is the auction regime. It will arise 
especially when the transaction object (product) is standardized or well-
defined, and performance ambiguity is low. Under such circumstances prices 
are appropriate information carriers. The transaction regime that comes most 
"Mintzberg (1989, p. 100-101) catalogs six ways in which firms and other organizations can 
coordinate their work: mutual adjustment, direct supervision; standardization of work processes; 
standardization of outputs; standardizations of skills and knowledge (common training); setting 
of intra-oganizational norms. 
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closely to the other extreme of the dichotomy is the direct control regime 
which governs the inter-departmental and inter-plant transactions within 
strictly hiërarchie firms. The direct control regime most likely will arise when 
the transaction object (product) is standardized and well-defined, and the 
production process is complex, involving various inputs and many stages, in 
which economies of scale are important. Information between partners is 
transferred by bureaucratie routines and decision rules.14 Such commands are 
used to restrain opportunistic behaviour. 
Transactions between and within companies may be governed by transactions 
regimes that essentially differ from the two regimes treated so far. The 
dependent subcontracting regime is characterized by formally independent 
firms which co-operate in a hiërarchie framework with asymmetrie power 
relations, with prices and 'outside' market conditions playing an important 
background role. This regime will especially flourish under conditions of 
segregated labour markets. Completely different is the industrial district 
regime. This exists where groups of interdependent firms of different size 
categories repeatedly interact and co-operate in a (local) network. Frequent 
consultations between these firms create co-operative patterns and a thorough 
familiarity between transaction partners. Industrial district regimes are 
particularly efficiënt under technological and market conditions where a high 
degree of flexibility and adaptive capacity is required, and where economies of 
scale are of minor importance for competitiveness. Examples can often be 
found in market segments with a high fashion content. 
Finally, in the clan regime neither market nor hiërarchie transaction 
procedures prevail. Frequent consultative procedures represent direct forms of 
pre-transaction information transfer. They lead to a thorough partner 
familiarity, goal congruence and co-operative patterns. Clan regimes are likely 
to be found under business conditions characterized by high levels of 
performance ambiguity, caused, for instance, by fast technological change or 
knowledge-intensive, non-standardized products. Hierarchical routine 
procedures or decision rules would be difficult to implement under such conditions. 
14
 "Whereas the activities of the single-unit traditional enterprises were monitored and 
coordinated by market mechanisms, the producing and distributing units within a modern 
business enterprise are monitored and coordinated by middle managers. Top managers, in 
addition to evaluating and coordinating the work of middle managers, took the place of the 
market in allocating resources for future production and distribution" (Chandler 1977, p.7). 
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At the end of this section it must again be stressed that the five transaction 
regimes which we propose, are still abstractions from economie reality. For in-
stance, in any existing industrial district some firms are dependent 
subcontractors, while some larger companies in the district may manage 
various departments through either direct control or clan systems. Also on the 
level of a singled-out transaction between firm A and firm B elements of more 
than one transaction regime can be present. 
5. Contours of a "non-fitting" allocation mechanism 
In the previous section we discussed the various transaction regimes, based on 
the elements in Table 1. In this section we shall return to the higher level of 
abstraction of the allocation principles. But first an important insight is drawn 
from the operationahzation of the transaction regimes, an insight with a 
bearing on the general discussion on market and hierarchy. 
In two of the five transaction regimes, Clan and Industrial District, co-
operative patterns play an important role in the allocation process. The 
growth of such co-operative patterns depends on the mutual recognition of 
interdependency by transaction partners. In the Industrial District regime this 
may result from technical interdependenties (specialisation within the 
production chain, asset specificity), or from the existence of an unstable 
business environment (volatile fashion-oriented markets, high pace of 
innovation, political instability). In the Clan transaction regime mutually 
recognized dependency results from the need to mobilize collective efforts 
oriented at quality improvement and innovation of product and production 
process. Since well-defined hierarchical evaluation instruments to measure 
such efforts are lacking, there is a high degree of ex ante performance 
ambiguity. Therefore, the required collective efforts will only arise through 
voluntary co-operation. 
In Table 1, the matrix comparison of the five transaction regimes, the co-
operation-oriented regimes can be shown to have a number of common 
characteristics, that are absent in both the auction and the direct control 
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transaction regime. Both co-operative transaction regimes share a distinctive 
common score on the following sub-elements : 
A21 Non-hierarchical relation between transaction partners; 
A33 Familiarity and mutual trust; 
B22 Pre-transaction information transfer by asking around; 
B33 Product specifïcation determined by mutual consultation; 
C23 Exchange proportions (co-)determined by long term mutual interest; 
D14 Opportunism may arise from lacking ex ante performance standards; 
D34 Opportunism checked by mutual familiarity (repeated game). 
Co-operation arises through frequent mutual consultation, a certain degree of 
goal congruence and repeated transactions. Opportunism is restrained by the 
development of mutual trust based on a thorough knowledge of each others 
situation and on the realization by specialists that they need each other. With 
anonymous transaction partners the critical issue is not that all actors behave 
opportunistically, but that it is very costly to find out who will and who will 
not behave opportunistically (Williamson & Ouchi 1981). The presence of 
mutual familiarity and trust enables conscious uninsured risk taking.15 Trust 
lowers the transaction costs as it increases the predictability of the others' 
behaviour, and lowers the need for contingent contracting. In a situation 
where entrepreneurs face uncertainties from outside their direct environment, 
the existence of co-operation patterns will lead to savings in time and 
contracting costs, and will therefore be comparatively efficiënt.16 Coming 
from another angle, the theory of repeated games and super games, in which 
players accept a long-run average pay-off, explains that co-operation develops 
among players, even irrespective of the initial presence or absence of trust (cf. 
Axelrod 1984; Mertens 1989). 
To sum up, in co-operation-oriented transaction regimes opportunism is dealt 
15
 One of the few comprehensive treatments on the concept of trust can be found in 
Gambetta (1988). 
16
 It is difficult to understand why Williamson (1991) considers this type of cooperative 
bargaining among transaction partners as more time consuming than arranging for detailed 
contracts with contingency provisions. On the contrary, to quote Arrow, *[i]t is useful for 
individuals to have some trust in each other's word. In the absence of trust, it would become 
very costly to arrange for altemative sanctions and guarantees, and many opportunities for 
mutually beneficial cooperation would have to be foregone" (Arrow 1969, p.60). 
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with in a way which is essentially different from 'pure' market or hierarchical 
allocation. The basic point to be made is that the five transaction regimes 
cannot be reduced to two allocation principles on a higher level of analysis. 
The analysis of transaction regimes thus substantiates the assumption of a 
possible third allocation principle: voluntary co-operation. Therefore, one 
might perceive of three allocation principles: market, hierarchy and co-
operation, controlled respectively through prices, authority and trust (See also: 
Bradach & Eccles 1989; Powell 1989). 
This conclusion can also take us one step further in overcoming another draw-
back of the market versus hierarchy discussion: its obsession with competition. 
The discussion tends to focus too narrowly on large firms and their make or 
buy decisions, while horizontal forms of co-operation are predominantly seen 
as collusive, competition-limiting practices. Price competition tends to focus 
on cost-cutting and short-term allocative efficiency. For long-term industrial 
development of a subsector or an industrial region, however, it is also 
necessary to create the 'infrastructural' conditions for further growth: basic 
investments, technological development, developments of skills, and 
supporting institutions. Many of such basic conditions have the character of a 
public good: once they exist, they are available to all parties, without 
exclusivity. When, for whatever reason, the burden of creating these 
conditions cannot be shifted to a government, they can only come into 
existence through co-operation and burden-sharing. While competition can 
ensure that firms remain innovative and responsive to change, only co-
operation can ensure long-term competitiveness through creating the 
necessary 'infrastructurar conditions. This is typically what happens in the 
Industrial District transaction regime. In the Clan regime the demand for co-
operation arises from the need to achieve long-term competitiveness in 
innovative or quality-sensitive subsectors. Within a company the achievement 
of such a goal is to a certain extent a 'public good', given its effect on future 
job-security and salary conditions. 
Several indications suggest that relations supplemented with trust, ceteris 
paribus, lead to better performance in the longer run and lower the threat of 
opportunistic behaviour. The success of Japanese and more recently Italian 
industrialization strategies has shown the importance of co-operation as a 
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complement to competition (cf. Best 1990; Pyke, Becattini & Sengenberger 
1990). In bis book on industrial restructuring Best (1990) claims that the basic 
reason for Japanese companies and 'The Third Italy' to outperfonn the large 
bureaucratie companies, based on Taylorist management and Fordist 
production methods, is that they have succeeded in finding a better balance 
between competition and co-operation. To get more grip on this balance we 
need to let go of a one-dimensional dichotomy approach, and include the 
concepts of co-operation and trust in our analysis, although we realise they 
are difficult to measure. 
6. Conchision 
Discussion on the market versus hierarchy dichotomy, outlined by Coase and 
elaborated on by Williamson, was an important stage in the development of 
the theory of the firm, transaction costs theory and the theory of industrial 
organization. Sticking to the dichotomy would, however, block further 
progress, since it is too rigid and conceptually too far from real life economie 
interaction patterns. In line with other findings, the analysis of transaction 
regimes also indicates towards the existence of a possible third allocation 
mechanism: voluntary co-operation. 
We introduced the concept of transaction regimes as an intermediary level of 
analysis which may contribute to a synthesis of prior insights and hitherto 
'non-fitting' observations related to real-life economie organization patterns. 
Transaction regimes possess the main elements of real forms of economie 
organization, and give full account to the fact that the history of mutual 
contacts between transaction partners has important implications for both 
price and transaction form. In the paper we distinguish five non-mixed 
transaction regimes which frequently occur in capitalist market economies. Of 
course, other regimes could be added, like the characteristic regime for state 
companies and for collusive interaction by large firms (e.g. price leadership). 
We hope this conceptual study can help others (and ourselves) in 
operationalizing future case studies on organizational forms. 
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